The two-pronged middle class: the old bourgeoisie, new state-engineered middle class and democratic development by Lankina, Tomila V. & Libman, Alexander
American Political Science Review (2021) 1–19
doi:10.1017/S000305542100023X © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political
Science Association. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.
The Two-Pronged Middle Class: The Old Bourgeoisie, New
State-Engineered Middle Class, and Democratic Development
TOMILA V. LANKINA London School of Economics and Political Science
ALEXANDER LIBMAN Freie Universität Berlin
We contribute to research on the democratic role of middle classes. Our paper distinguishesbetween middle classes emerging autonomously during gradual capitalist development andthose fabricated rapidly as part of state-led modernization. To make the case for a conceptual
distinction between these groups within one national setting, we employ author-assembled historical
district data, survey, and archival materials for pre-Revolutionary Russia and its feudal estates. Our
analysis reveals that the bourgeois estate of meshchane covaries with post-communist democratic
competitiveness and media freedoms, our proxies of regional democratic variations. We propose two
causal pathways explaining the puzzling persistence of social structure despite the Bolsheviks’ leveling
ideology and post-communist autocratic consolidation: (a) processes at the juncture of familial channels of
human capital transmission and the revolutionaries’ modernization drive and (b) entrepreneurial value
transmission outside of state policy. Our findings help refine recent work on political regime orientations
of public-sector-dependent societies subjected to authoritarian modernization.
Some structures, because of their long life, become stable
elements for an infinite number of generations: they get in
the way of history, hinder its flow, and in hindering it shape
it. Others wear themselves out more quickly.
—Braudel 1995, 122
INTRODUCTION
F rom Hellenic thought to present-day theorizing,scholars have postulated the significance of themiddle class in affecting the balance between
democracy and tyranny. Aristotle wrote about the
reasonableness of the propertied, rule-abiding, enlight-
ened strata and their role in nurturing a middle
ground between oligarchy and mob rule (Glassman,
Switos, and Kivisto 1993). And in present-day autocra-
cies, educated professionals, students, and entrepre-
neurs often rally behind pro-democracy protest
movements, whether in Moscow or Hong Kong
(Ortmann 2015; Tertytchnaya and Lankina 2020).
Yet, we also have many examples of the democratic
ambivalences, indeed authoritarian complicity, of mid-
dle classes across a variety of contexts. “Contingent,”
“pragmatic,” and “dependent” are some of the epi-
taphs on the metaphorical tombstones charting the
demise of the idea of the middle class as a harbinger
of democracy (Bell 1998; Bellin 2000; Chen 2013; Foa
2018; Greene and Robertson 2019). Nations with a
history of state-led development and autocracies
“incubating” a bloated public sector ostensibly harbor
a middle class that falls particularly short of democratic
expectations (Kohli 2007; Rosenfeld 2017;Wright 2010).
While drawing inspiration from these rich debates,
we take issue with their somewhat one-dimensional
portrayals of the middle class (but see Baviskar and
Ray 2011). Contingent orientations and material
dependencies on the state of course matter. But so does
heterogeneitywithin a multitier middle class comprised
of subgroups originating in distinct historical epochs
and under different political regimes. Much of the
recent scholarship on post-communist regimes in par-
ticular has largely neglected these longue durée aspects
of the middle class. And the “great leveler” paradigms
have continued to influence our thinking about the
class structures of twentieth century “totalitarian” dic-
tatorships (Piketty 2014; Scheidel 2017). These works
have underlined the wholesale destruction of the
wealth of the “old” bourgeoisie in the furnaces of
revolutionary repression and wars. Such assumptions
are insensitive however to nonmaterial forms of social
resilience. Prominent works in sociology have long
argued that educational, professional, and cultural val-
ues are often transmitted within families and commu-
nities (Bourdieu 2010; Clark 2015; Verba, Burns, and
Schlozman 2005; Weber 1966). This could lead to the
coexistence of multiple substrata of different historical
origin within the middle class.
Our paper contributes to debates about the role of
the bourgeoisie/middle class1 in autocracies. We distin-
guish between “prongs” within this broad stratum—
one prong originating within a capitalist order and
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another rapidly fabricated as part of state-led develop-
ment. Our account departs from earlier research in that
we conceptually and empirically parcel out the demo-
cratic legacies of historically distinct segments of a
stratum conventionally bracketed under one generic
umbrella. We make our case by leveraging within-
country variation in historical legacies of Russia’s social
structure. Russia’s regions have also starkly varied in
the competitiveness of electoral races, vibrancy of civil
society, and robustness of media scrutiny of politicians
(Gel’man and Ross 2010; Petrov 2005; Reisinger and
Moraski 2017; Saikkonen 2017; Sharafutdinova 2011).
To capture these within-nation democratic variations,
we use district- and region-level measures of demo-
cratic competitiveness and media freedom. The subna-
tional research design allows us to hold constant
national-level institutional frameworks and guarantees
for political contestation.
We locate the genesis of the “old” prongof themiddle
class, as distinct from the “new” communist-engineered
one, in the intricacies of Tsarist Russia’s institution of
estates. This institution survived until the 1917 Bol-
shevik Revolution. The “four-estate paradigm” divided
citizens into nobility, clergy, the urban estates of mer-
chants and meshchane, and peasants (Mironov 2014).
We regard the numerically sizeable meshchane as
constituting the bulk of Russia’s pre-Revolutionary
bourgeoisie. This designation encapsulates the material
dimension of property ownership and less tangible char-
acteristics like cultural capital and educational and
professional aspirations (Rosenfeld 2017). Imperial
Russia’s meshchane were not only prominent in trades
and entrepreneurship; they increasingly colonized elite
secondary schools (gymnasia), universities, and the pro-
fessions. The medical doctor-turned-writer of global
acclaim Anton Chekhov listed himself as meshchanin
when enrolling at university; his sister taught in a gym-
nasium (Bartlett 2004).
For our analysis, we constructed a unique historical
dataset coveringRussia’s entire territory. To our know-
ledge, we are the first to have matched Imperial dis-
tricts with some 2,000 of their Soviet and present-day
administrative equivalents.2 The rich district (uezd)-
level socioeconomic, occupational, and demographic
statistics from the first General Population Census of
1897 (Troynitskiy 1905) allow us to trace the corres-
pondence between past social structure and present-
day democratic variations. Individual-level data from a
large author-commissioned survey carried out by
Levada, Russia’s top polling agency, corroborate the
robustness of associations between estate and present-
day political outcomes. We also gathered archival and
memoir materials illuminating the bourgeoisie’s adap-
tation to life in Bolshevik Russia.
Succinctly, we argue that the bourgeois estates’ leg-
acies affect democratic processes via the (1) human
capital and (2) entrepreneurial experiences and values
channels. The human-capital channel takes account of
the Bolsheviks’ appropriation of educated citizens as
white-collar professionals. We also consider familial
mechanisms of transmission of “bourgeois” values of
educational attainment and aspiration for high-status
professions. The entrepreneurial channel operates via
societal transmission of values outside of state purview,
for communist regimes ideologically vilified markets
and private enterprise. Our argument takes account of
the persistence of the “bourgeois” social stratum. It
also considers its role in the genesis of educated and
entrepreneurial population more broadly. Statistical
tests confirm that the “bourgeois” legacies account
for spatial variations in democratic competitiveness
and media freedoms.
Our study is inspired by, and contributes to, the
literature on intertemporal persistence in institutions,
social structures, and values (Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson 2001; Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016;
Buggle and Nafziger 2019; Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010;
Charnysh and Finkel 2017; Cirone andVanCoppenolle
2019; Dasgupta 2018; Glaeser et al. 2004; Kopstein and
Reilly 1999; Lankina, Libman, and Tertytchnaya 2020;
Mazumder 2018; Simpser, Slater, andWittenberg 2018;
Voigtlaender and Voth 2012). In many studies “inter-
vening periods” between the legacy’s origin and long-
term implications often remain “full of questionmarks”
(Simpser, Slater, and Wittenberg 2018, 421). We per-
form step-by-step analyses deploying data for distinct
regimes, thereby illuminating transmissionmechanisms
in the causal chain.
Our paper is structured as follows. We first ground
our theoretical assumptions in the literature on social
structure and democracy. We then discuss Imperial
Russia’s estates and justify the conceptualization of
meshchane as a bourgeois stratum. Next, we outline
the hypothesized transmission channels. We then dis-
cuss data and statistical analysis. The final
section concludes with a discussion of findings and
implications for wider scholarship.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND DEMOCRACY
Our baseline assumptions are that elements of Imperial
social structure survived the Bolshevik social experi-
ment; and that old regime bourgeois legacies have
implications for post-communist democratic outcomes.
We follow other scholars in defining legacy as “a
durable causal relationship between past institutions
and policies on subsequent practices or beliefs, long
beyond the life of the regimes, institutions, and policies
that gave birth to them” (Kotkin and Beissinger 2014,
7). Social structure is here defined as a pattern of
social relationships delineating social groups and built
around social, economic, and cultural status (Mousnier,
Labatut, and Durand 1995).
Our analysis is inspired by classic works on the
political orientations of the bourgeoisie in historical
sociology (Luebbert 1991; Moore 1993); political sci-
ence (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1991; Lipset 1959); and
historical political economy (Acemoglu, Hassan, and
Robinson 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ansell
2 Buggle and Nafziger (2019) employ district data for European
Russia.

























































































































and Samuels 2014). These research strands variously
emphasize the bourgeoisie’s market-supporting values,
entrepreneurial ethos, and demands to protect prop-
erty rights via democratic institutions. They also draw
attention to the democratic implications of educated
populations sharing the values of tolerance, respect for
autonomy, and a broad “normative commitment” to
democracy (Herman 2016, 254). However, numerous
studies have questioned whether middle classes—and
modernization processes arguably engendering this
stratum—always straightforwardly covary with democ-
racy (Dahl 1971; O’Donnell 1973; Slater 2010). Post-
communist nations present particularly intriguing
dilemmas when it comes to middle class–democracy
links: they tend to be less democratic than nations with
similar levels of socioeconomic development (Epstein
et al. 2006;Herman2016; Pop-Eleches andTucker 2017).
Robert Dahl (1971, 73) provides a convenient
heuristic for refining expectations about middle-class
political orientations. He distinguishes between devel-
opment that unfolds “autonomously” over a long
stretch of time and one that advances rapidly in an
“induced,” “centralized” or “hegemonic” fashion (see
also Hoselitz 1965, 43). Across many developing set-
tings, state-directed development has produced a mid-
dle class only weakly committed to democracy
(Baviskar and Ray 2011; Chen 2013; Jones 1998). In
“induced” settings, the middle classes are often highly
state dependent (Chen 2013). Since the states take the
lead in rapid industrialization to “catch up” with more
developed nations (Gerschenkron 1962), the state-
dependent middle class frequently lacks experience in
navigating the market (Chen 2013), in contrast to
countries where private entrepreneurship, risk taking,
and generalized trust originate in, and are transmitted
intergenerationally within, society (Dohmen et al.
2012; Tabellini 2008). Additionally, white-collar
employees of a rapidly engineered variety are often
low-status and enjoy weak occupational autonomy
(Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Speier 1986). By con-
trast, elite professions require lengthy specialized train-
ing and parental injunction and investment (Bourdieu
and Passeron 1990; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2005;
Weber 1966). Finally, middle classes that owe their
livelihoods to autocracies may hesitate to challenge
them (Chen 2013; Rosenfeld 2017).
Communist countries present fertile terrains for ana-
lyzing covariance between middle-class origin and
democracy. Here “peasant metropolises” (Hoffmann
1994) have featured middle classes hastily fabricated
pursuant to ideological doctrine on the social elevation
of peasant and proletarian masses. By 1990, Soviet
urbanization had reached 66%, yet among those in
the 60-years age bracket, a mere 15–17% were urban
born; 40% among those aged 40; and only those aged
20 and younger featured over 50% native urbanites.
“By the time of the USSR’s collapse,” writes Anatoliy
Vishnevskiy, “citizens in their majority remained urb-
anites in the first generation” (2010, 94).
Such rapid sociodemographic changes may have
well engendered a “new” middle class conceptually
distinguishable from the “old” one, which came into
existence during the Tzarist period. We are careful not
to idealize ancien régime Russia—a monarchy with
incipient institutions of parliamentary democracy. But
Russia had been also an “under-governed” empire with
weak state penetration in peripheral districts (Mironov
2015, 436). It allowed for local initiative and govern-
ance—notably via the zemstvomovement (Dower et al.
2018). Especially in the last few decades of the Empire,
market enterprise, civil society, and private philan-
thropy flourished (Balzer 1996;Golitsyn 2016;Orlovsky
1991). This historical record is suggestive of a more
“autonomous” developmental context compared with
the far more “centralized” communist regime, which
stifled markets, local autonomy, and civic initiative.
Our task is to parcel out the legacies of a bourgeoisie
originating in a prior, more autonomous developmen-
tal order from those of middle classes fabricated in a
state-planned way. This is a formidable challenge. Com-
munist states notoriously persecuted the bourgeoisie
(Alexopoulos 2003; Dikötter 2016). The urbanization
figures provided above accentuate social-compositional
shifts in space. Yet, even if we pause to digest Vishnevs-
kiy’s (2010) urbanization statistics, we cannot simply
disregard the “old” urbanites—millions of people—
coexisting with peasant entrants into the “new” middle
class. Further, as recent studies have shown, the revo-
lutionary state built upon, and in complex ways inter-
acted with, pre-communist socioeconomic legacies
(Kotkin and Beissinger 2014; Lankina, Libman, and
Obydenkova 2016). Indeed, to an extent cultural values
(Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006), partisan loyalties
(Wittenberg 2006), and civic attitudes (Peisakhin 2013)
survived Leninist projects. The author-assembled arch-
ival andmemoir materials are suggestive of coexistence
of the “new” middle class with “old” professionals,
entrepreneurs, and rentier (Golitsyn 2016; Golubkov
2010; Neklutin 1976; Tchuikina 2006).
To capture middle-class heterogeneity based on ori-
gins, however, we ought to identify pre-communist
population groups corresponding to the “bourgeoisie”
designation. We now turn to motivating our choice of
purported social carriers of a bourgeois legacy.
RUSSIA’S BOURGEOISIE
Until the Revolution, Russia combined features of a
feudal order where individuals are divided into unequal
caste-like social categories—estate (sosloviye)—with
those of a modern society where at least in theory
everyone possesses equal rights (Wirtschafter 1997).
The historian Boris Mironov defines estate as “a jurid-
ically circumscribed group with hereditary rights and
obligations” (2014, 334). The main estates in Russia
were nobles, clergy, town dwellers (mostly meshchane
and merchants), and peasants. Tsar Alexander II’s
Great Reforms, notably peasant emancipation in 1861,
accelerated the erosion of estate boundaries (Dower
et al. 2018; Finkel, Gehlbach, and Olsen 2015; Nafziger
2011). Nevertheless, “the four-estate” paradigm
remained an important social and juridical concept
(Freeze 1986;Mironov 2014, 339). It influencedproperty

























































































































rights, human capital, educational aspirations, and occu-
pational choices. The overwhelmingly illiteratemanorial
peasants remained the most disadvantaged groups even
after emancipation (Mironov 2014; Wirtschafter 1997).
Figure 1 helps visualize Russia’s estate structure.
After the Revolution, a wide range of groups were
bracketed as “bourgeois”—from aristocracy to petty
tradesmen (Fitzpatrick 1993). The aristocracy, clergy,
merchants, and meshchane boasted comparatively
high education and literacy rates; they constituted the
bulk of early Soviet intelligentsia. The aristocracy
became the target of particularly vicious witch hunts
(Alexopoulos 2003). Aristocrats were also unlikely
carriers of entrepreneurial legacy. Memoirs in the
genre of “survival” chronicling the lives of fallen aris-
tocrats corroborate either habitual disdain for entre-
preneurship or inability to engage in market pursuits
when opportunities briefly opened during the New
Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s (Golitsyn 2016).
The other high-human-capital stratum of clergy were
not only subjected to restrictions on private enterprise
under the Tzars (Mironov 2015, 45) but also targeted
for repressions under the Bolsheviks. Because of low
social status of clergy families in the Imperial era, many
youths from this estate embraced radical left move-
ments (Mironov 2014, 377). Merchants most closely
approximated the twin bourgeois characteristics of
interest to us—high human capital and entrepreneur-
ship. Unlike meshchane, often characterized as petite
bourgeoisie or lower middle class, a merchant title
signified considerable material wealth (Rieber 1982).
Furthermore, merchants were heavily investing in
their children’s education. Wealth and modern edu-
cation in turn enabled both private enterprise and
professional employment (Neklutin 1976). Yet, like
aristocrats, merchants constituted a tiny fraction of the
population—less than 1%. Because many merchants
carried prominent names, they were visible targets
for persecution.
Overall, meshchane possessed the twin characteris-
tics that interest us. They were a high-human-capital
stratum with market experience. They were also the
most numerous estate after peasants and were far less
conspicuous as class witch hunts unfolded.We consider
meshchane as engendering a bourgeois legacy because
of their legal status, property rights, and opportunities
for accumulation of material and human capital. Until
the beginning of the eighteenth century, all estates,
including nobles, lacked clearly defined legal rights
and freedoms (Mironov 2015, 38). Nobles and clergy-
men were the first to obtain protections against arbi-
trary crown rule, followed by the wealthiest urban
stratum of merchants. After a time lag,meshchane also
obtained special privileges. The Russian Empress of
German origin Catherine the Great saw merchants,
artisans, and meshchane as European-style civilized,
law-abiding, and tax-paying burghers (Smith 2014).
She therefore granted urban estates a special charter
in 1785 that enhanced their privileges vis-à-vis the
unfree estate of peasants and others who wished to
own property, pursue trade, or reside in towns. Tell-
ingly, the 1897 census, which contains French transla-
tions of estates, lists only one group—meshchane—as
bourgeois de ville—“bourgeois of city” (Troynitskiy
1905). The addition of “bourgeois” next to “de ville”
signifies meshchane’s distinction from peasants in
towns: seasonal and other peasant laborers in some
cities constituted half the population.
Much like with the emergence of burghers elsewhere
in Europe, a combination of factors shaped the spatial
distribution of town dwellers engaged in nonagricul-
tural occupations. In some territories, peasants were
granted state peasant status, which came with greater
freedoms as compared with those of serfs on gentry
FIGURE 1. Imperial Russia’s Four Key Estates
Nobility, incl. hereditary and 
personal (1.5%)
Clergy (.5%)
Urban: Meshchane (10.7%); hon. 
ciz. (.3%); merchants (.2%)
Peasants (77.1%)
Note: Image created by authors; Empire-wide 1897 census data.

























































































































manors; this status eased transition into commercial
occupations in towns. Elsewhere, as in the Pale of Settle-
ment, some communities like Jews faced restrictions
on rural residence or occupations. An advantageous
geographic location or poor soil quality also spurred
commerce and artisan trades, facilitating peasants’ accu-
mulation of capital and acquisition of a foothold in towns.
As towns grew, they became magnets for “social
deviants”—adventurous peasants escaping the manor
or rural entrepreneurs with sufficient literacy, skills,
and capital to move to towns (Lankina Forthcoming).
Yet, while estate to some extent reflected society, as
an institution it also shaped social stratification. Urban
burghers were granted special rights to trade, com-
merce, and property ownership within cities and legal
protections, while peasants lacked the same kinds of
rights (Mironov 2015). Urban self-governance and
autonomy helped safeguard these rights. We acknow-
ledge that all estates—including serfs—enjoyed some
form of self-governance even at the height of absolut-
ism, not least because there were too few state func-
tionaries tomicromanage localities in the Empire’s vast
reaches. The difference is that some, like nobles, clergy,
and merchants obtained the status of free citizens with
more substantive autonomy to govern their estate and
localities early on, followed by meshchane and man-
orial peasants—with a lag of nearly one hundred years
after meshchane. As Mironov notes, “the trading-
industrial population of cities, more than any other
social group of Russian society, understood the import-
ance of individual rights for successful economic activ-
ity in the sphere of commerce, artisan pursuits and
industry.” It therefore fought tooth and nail to curb
state expropriations of urban property, demanded
respect for private property, and secured the establish-
ment of special estate courts governed by law (2015,
47). By the end of the eighteenth century, urban
communes of elected burghers had acquired juridical
person status, while the state peasants’ communes
obtained these rights in the 1840s and manorial
peasants—only in the 1860s (Mironov 2015, 249).
Thus, early on, burghers were able to rely on the
letter of the law to fight random infractions against
property. Although merchants enjoyed greater legal
rights and protections thanmeshchane, anymeshchanin
could become a merchant by accumulating wealth.
Furthermore, “consolidation of right to private prop-
erty provided a stimulus for property accumulation
without fear that it might be at any moment confiscated
by the state” (Mironov 2015, 50). Even after the prom-
ulgation of peasant freedoms, the urban bourgeoisie
were able to consolidate their hold on urban assets,
enterprises, and trade, disadvantaging peasant new-
comers. Meshchane’s corporate bodies engaged in
selection and inclusion based on criteria of “moral
worth” and creditworthiness. Certificates vouching
for newcomers’ credentials were solicited, and bur-
ghers sought to keep destitute, property-less peasants
out of towns (Smith 2014). Because Imperial Russia
failed to set up universal public schooling, well-off
burghers enjoyed early-riser advantages in the educa-
tionalmarketplace.They could affordpaid-for instruction
in classical and professional-technical schools, and many
obtained university degrees.
We could trace the fortunes of meshchane if we
compare accounts focusing on the early nineteenth
century and those closer to the end of the monarchy.
In the earlier period, many meshchane reportedly
engaged in both urban trades and quasi-rural pursuits
of raising livestock and crops (Hildermeier 1985).
Accounts covering the later period provide strong
evidence of commercialization, professionalization,
and social elevation ofmeshchane; many attained mer-
chant or “honored citizen” status. Census records cor-
roborate the meshchane’s stature as a propertied petit
or middling bourgeois of an “industrious society”
(de Vries 2008) variety. Significant chunks were
“employers of labor,” running a “one person enterprise”
and “employers using only family members” (Orlovsky
1991, 251–2).Manywere rentier—renting out a “corner”
or room to students, professionals, and peasant seasonal
laborers (Dolgopyatov 2009; Koshman 2016). Mesh-
chane also worked as pharmacists, bookkeepers, statist-
icians,middlemanagers, free professionals, and teachers
(Hildermeier 1985; Kobozeva 2013; Orlovsky 1991).
Tellingly, the meshchane acquired a solid footing in
Soviet-era scholarship as the “bourgeoisie.” Lenin,
who set the tone for subsequent ideologically charged
discourse on themeshchane, peppered his writings with
their characterizations “in a political-economic mean-
ing of this term” as “a petty producer operating under
systems of market production” (Lenin [1895] 1967).
A 1920s Soviet encyclopedia equated “meshchanin” to
“small bourgeoisie in the West.” Throughout the
Soviet decades, ideological struggles against mesh-
chanstvo waxed and waned, usually coinciding with
the regime’s battle against the “capitalistic processes”
of the shadow market economy (Akkuratov 2002).
TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS
We have highlighted three features of meshchanstvo’s
legacy: a combination of market-supporting pursuits,
comparatively high human capital, and experiences of
autonomous governance. How did these legacies sur-
vive across multiple generations in a regime ideologic-
ally hostile to the old bourgeoisie?We identify two key
mechanisms of transmission: familial socialization and
processes at the juncture of societal values and state
policy.
Familial Channels of HumanCapital and Value
Transmission
We derive our first transmission mechanism from the-
ories of the family’s imprint on human, cultural, social,
and economic capital (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990;
Coleman 1988; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2005).
This channel has been restated in numerous studies of
communist societies (Bessudnov 2016; Gerber and
Hout 1995; Shkaratan and Yastrebov 2011; Shubkin
et al. 1968a; Teckenberg 1981/1982). High human
and cultural capital often drive self-selection into

























































































































“deliberative,” as distinct from “executive” employ-
ment sites—academia, medicine, or the arts (Sorokin
1927, 116). In communist countries, these provided a
modicum of professional autonomy, were least satur-
ated with ideology, or featured lax party membership
criteria (Mark 2005; Rigby 1968; Szelényi 1988). The
state-engineered middle class—including the illiterate
or semiliterate peasants and factory workers who
enjoyed preferential quotas in university admissions
and employment—were not as well positioned to
ascend into high-status autonomous professions
(Shubkin et al. 1968b). Stalled or reverse mobility was
common in communist countries (Erikson and Gold-
thorpe 1992; Gerber and Hout 1995; Shubkin et al.
1968a). The less-privileged groups also stood to lose
more during market transition (Gerber and Hout
2004). We expect territories with a greater share of
old bourgeoisie to sustain higher levels of human cap-
ital, which would spill over into relatively autonomous
professions, as compared with those where the new
state-engineered middle class predominated.
We conjecture that familial socialization would also
account for the transmission of market values. Entre-
preneurship flourished as soon as restrictions for the
operation of markets were loosened from 1922 to 1928
during NEP (Osokina 2001). Many “nepmen” who
seized business opportunities had been entrepreneurs
in the past. Revisionist historiography and data from
the “lost” 1937 census (Zhiromskaya, Kiselyov, and
Polyakov 1996) highlight the pervasiveness of the black
market even at the height of Stalinism (Edele 2011;
Osokina 2001). We therefore expect territories with a
comparatively large pre-Revolutionary bourgeoisie to
feature workforce that is more willing to embrace
private enterprise.
The State Reinforcing Social Inequalities by
Leveraging Skills of Educated Groups
In articulating our second transmission channel, we are
sensitive to the regime’s role in exacerbating extant
social stratification. In Pierre Bourdieu’s work, for
instance, the state emerges as an unwitting accomplice
to inequalities in that school curricula and elite civil
service jobs favor those from middle class backgrounds
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). Across a variety of
contexts, the imperatives of development or state con-
solidation have incentivized rulers to co-opt the edu-
cated elite and middle classes (Fabbe 2019; Kohli 2007;
Mamdani 1997). In communist systems too, class vigi-
lance often went hand in hand with perks for the old
bourgeoisie. Lenin, a “fervent egalitarian” (Matthews
1978, 20), performed a volte-face on class when it
became evident that rapid modernization would not
be achieved relying on peasant and proletarian cadre
alone. The “hardware”—Imperial schools, hospitals,
universities—were also appropriated to serve the
Bolsheviks’ developmental agenda (Lankina, Libman,
and Obydenkova 2016). The appropriations of extant
facilities likely accentuated the social distinction
between newer urban hubs and older conurbations
with established bourgeoisie.
HYPOTHESES
We conjecture that a combination of factors would
account for the hypothesized covariance between the
bourgeois legacy and long-termpolitical outcomes. First,
we expect bourgeois legacies to engender a more dis-
cerning, politically informed, and engaged citizenry.
Following recent critiques of the modernization para-
digm (Rosenfeld 2017), we consider occupational struc-
ture as an important intermediating channel linking
human capital to political outcomes. The lower-skilled
state-dependent workforce is more vulnerable than are
skilled professionals to political pressures andworkplace
mobilization (Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2014; Hale
2015; Rosenfeld 2017; Stokes 2007). Relatedly, territor-
ies with a robust legacy of old bourgeoisie would feature
a workforce able to diversify the portfolio of employ-
ment options beyond the public sector. Our main
hypothesis therefore postulates covariance between
the “old” middle class and democratic outcomes.
(We discuss our operationalizations and measures of
democracy below). Two supplementary hypotheses
are also proposed with reference to transmission
mechanisms. (See also Figure 2).
H1: Pre-communist bourgeoisie is positively correlated
with democratic outcomes over and above the effects of
Soviet modernization.
H2: Pre-communist bourgeoisie is positively correlated
with education in communist and post-communist
Russia.
H3: Pre-communist bourgeoisie is positively correlated
with post-communist private sector employment, profes-
sional workforce, and entrepreneurship.
DATA, SOURCES, AND KEY MEASURES
District Data and Matching
To ascertain the democratic legacies of Tsarist social
structure via the human capital and entrepreneurial
value-transmission channels, we rely on awithin-nation
research design and employ subnational data. This
approach helps improve identification via reduction
of unobserved heterogeneity associated with cross-
country variation in historical modernization patterns.
The 1897 census contains detailed data for uezdy (dis-
tricts), the administrative unit below the gubernii
(regional) level roughly corresponding to present-day
rayony and usually encompassing a major town and
surrounding rural areas. We only include districts that
are administratively part of Russia now, which comes
to 423 observations in the Imperial period dataset.
The dataset combining pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-
communist data has about 2,000 observations, reflecting

























































































































administrative reorganizations over time. We exclude
Moscow and St. Petersburg cities as outliers. Details of
district matching are available in the Statistical Appen-
dix (SA) 1.1.3 Higher-level regions (oblast, kray, repub-
lic) and survey data are employed to test some of the
hypotheses (Further details in SA2).
Motivating the Choice of Democracy
Measures
Wedraw onDahl’sPolyarchy tomotivate our choice of
the dimensions and operationalizations of the key out-
come variable. Dahl’s baseline condition for a demo-
cratic political system is institutional guarantees for
citizens to be able to formulate and signify heterogen-
ous preferences and to have them “weighted equally in
conduct of government” (1971, 3). These guarantees
include right to vote, right of political leaders to com-
pete for support, availability of alternative sources of
information, and free and fair elections. But democracy
is meaningless unless institutional guarantees are hon-
ored in practice. Citizens may enjoy the right to vote,
elections held regularly, and freedom of expression
enshrined in the constitution, but ballot-stuffing may
be rampant, journalists harassed, and chunks of the
electorate uninformed and indifferent to these injust-
ices. Furthermore, Dahl raises the possibility that the
practice of democracy may vary across a country’s
subnational units. Whether institutional guarantees
are provided or not, “social characteristics” like a weak
middle class, low levels of educational attainment, and
“an authoritarian political culture” may hinder com-
petitive politics (1971, 74). Dahl therefore captures
both the supply side of democratic institutions, as
enshrined in laws, and the demand side of a populace
able to take full advantage of the right to signify
preferences and to hold politicians to account.
Our subnational research design allows us to
hold constant national-level institutional frameworks
governing these rights while teasing out subnational
variations in the actual practice of democratic
contestation. But even for the national, let alone sub-
national, level, operationalizing and measuring the
various aspects of citizen opportunity and agency in
the electoral arena presents notorious challenges. For-
tunately, there are measures of some of the key aspects
of the democratic process that have been validated in
different subnational settings. We believe these meas-
ures help evaluate three important facets of Dahl’s
ideal-type democratic system: the extent to which citi-
zens exercise their right to vote in free and fair elections
and thereby are able and willing to hold politicians to
account, the extent to which political leaders can com-
pete for support, and freedom of expression/availability
of alternative sources of information. We bracket the
electoral dimensions under the rubric of “democratic
competitiveness” and availability of information as
“media freedom.”
Democratic Competitiveness
To evaluate the competitiveness aspects of democratic
process, we draw onmeasures of electoral participation
and competition deployed in earlier studies (Petrov
2005; Saikkonen 2017). One such measure is effective
number of candidates (ENC): it captures the degree to
which citizen preference heterogeneity is reflected in
votes for candidates in a competitive race. Higher ENC
implies that a larger number of contestants received a
sizable share of votes. This indicator, however, may
overestimate electoral contestation where voter par-
ticipation is modest and where a large measure of
effective number of candidates could emerge acciden-
tally. One way to deal with this issue is to deploy the
more generic index of democratic competitiveness
(IDC). Although this simple formula (Vanhanen
2000) was developed to gauge national-level demo-
cratic variations, several studies have validated it at
the level of subnational politics in contexts as diverse
as India and Ukraine (Beer and Mitchell 2006;
Lankina and Libman 2019). The index is based on
two indicators: participation (electoral turnout) and
competition (vote share for a candidate except those
with the highest share of votes). The index allows us to
gauge the extent to which a single political actor is
FIGURE 2. Logic of the Argument
3 Data and replication files are available at the APSR Dataverse:
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JO8C7A.

























































































































dominant while also considering the level of citizen
turnout in elections. This index is a sound way of
capturing the reality of manipulated and controlled
elections in present-day autocracies. Consider a scen-
ario where local political bosses and enterprises
are instrumental in mobilizing docile, dependent, or
poorly educated electorates, thereby driving high
turnout, but for a specific candidate only. We would
have high turnout, but the index value would be still
small because the share of nonwinning candidates
would be modest.
We are upfront about potential issues with applying
the ENC and IDCmeasures to the subnational level. In
small jurisdictions, low values on indicators of demo-
cratic competitiveness could reflect strong partisan
preferences. In the US, in some “red” or “blue” dis-
tricts individual candidates dominate elections for dec-
ades. Here low IDC and ENC may signal strong
partisan loyalties. Unlike the US or other developed
nations featuring relatively stable geographic patterns
of electoral preferences, or countries like Ukraine with
strong identity-based preference polarization, since the
1990s, Russia has featured volatility in citizen party-
candidate preferences (Gehlbach 2000; Menyashev
2011). We therefore regard the Vanhanen measure as
a suitable proxy for subnational competitiveness.
Media Freedom
Another key dimension of the democratic process that
we could measure relates to freedom of expression/
availability of alternative sources of information. Fol-
lowing Dahl, we expect citizens to make informed
choices about political candidates when contestants
can freely distribute information about their
platforms—in independent press outlets, TV channels,
or online media—and individuals have access to this
information. We have at hand the 1999 Russian
regional press freedom index developed by the Insti-
tute of Public Expertise (IPE). The index measures
freedom of access to information, ease of news produc-
tion, and distribution. These region-level data also
nicely complement the district-level electoral competi-
tiveness data. Consider the possibility that some candi-
dates in an election could garner an overwhelming
share of the vote because of broad-based support
rather than lack of political competition per
se. Establishing that themeshchane legacy is correlated
with complementary proxies of democratic variations
like media pluralism even under such a scenario would
provide greater confidence that we are not simply




We begin by testing whether our hypothesized associ-
ation between the “old”bourgeoisie andpost-communist
subnational political variations holds (H1). To capture
rayon-level variations in democratic competitiveness,we
employ data from the first round of the 1996 presidential
contest. Despite noted electoral irregularities, it is con-
sidered more competitive than subsequent electoral
races (Hale 2003; Reisinger and Moraski 2017).
Table 1 reports the correlations between meshchane
and our two democratic competitiveness proxies, con-
ditional on other rayon characteristics. In the district-
level analysis, all regressions include oblast fixed effects
to reduce the effects of unobserved heterogeneity. We
start by estimating a reduced-form regression, includ-
ing only fixed effects, to avoid over-control bias (Lenz
and Sahn 2020). Because this model may miss import-
ant confounders, in the next step we add controls
capturing historical economic development and indus-
trialization, ethno-linguistic legacies, geographic loca-
tion, and contemporary wealth and development
(discussed in detail in SA3.1).
Regardless of the model, meshchane are associated
with higher democratic competitiveness. Thus, a rayon
with 30% of meshchane compared with one with no
meshchane would have 0.45 more effective candidates
—in 1996 the average was 3.32, and 5.96 the rayon
maximum. Cross-sectional regressions of course do not
fully eliminate omitted variable bias.We therefore intro-
duce a battery of controls and robustness checks in SA,
adding multiple further controls (Dower et al. 2018;
Zhukov and Talibova 2018) and additional modifica-
tions to our regressions (SA3.1, SA3.3–3.7), and trace
the meshchane effect over time using multiple quantita-
tive indicators and qualitative characteristics of mesh-
chane in the Historical Appendix (HA.III, Tables 3–5).
In a further check reported in SA3.8, we employ data
for the 1995 parliamentary elections. The elections
exhibited extremely high levels of political fragmenta-
tion, with 43 parties running. The results fully confirm
our findings. In SA3.9, we analyze the 2012 presidential
race coinciding with authoritarian consolidation.
Although we find some evidence of meshchane legacy,
it is weaker and less robust.We interpret this result with
reference to consolidated authoritarianism. A decrease
in electoral integrity may incentivize “deliberate
disengagement” among educated strata (Croke et al.
2016). In SA3.10 and SA3.22 we compare the influence
of “new” and “old”middle classes on competitiveness.
Media Freedom: Region-Level Analysis
We now deploy the 1999 IPE regional press freedom
index. Higher index values correspond to higher
press freedoms. We find that the index is positively
correlatedwithmeshchane (Table 2). The results hold if
we regress the media score on meshchane controlling
for predictors of subnational democratic competitiveness
conventionally employed in the literature on Russia’s
regions (SA3.1) and when excluding five regions with
the largest share of meshchane to deal with outliers (fur-
ther robustness checks and discussion in SA3.10–SA3.11).
An increase in the share of meshchane by 1 percentage
point increases the press freedom index by about 0.006–
0.011 units, with the index varying between 0.101 and

























































































































TABLE 1. Meshchane and Democratic Competitiveness in 1996
Dependent variable IDC ENC IDC ENC IDC ENC IDC ENC IDC ENC
Meshchane 0.136 0.015 0.156 0.012 0.194 0.016 0.197 0.016 0.107 0.008
(0.039)*** (0.003)*** (0.044)*** (0.003)*** (0.049)*** (0.003)*** (0.050)*** (0.003)*** (0.051)** (0.003)**
Imperial industrial
employment
−0.025 0.004 −0.032 0.003 −0.034 0.003 −0.030 0.000
(0.026) (0.002)** (0.026) (0.002)* (0.026) (0.002)* (0.027) (0.002)
Shares of religious groups in the Imperial period
Old believers 0.045 0.003 0.046 0.003 0.040 0.003
(0.033) (0.002) (0.034) (0.002) (0.034) (0.002)
Catholics −0.084 −0.010 −0.074 −0.010 0.063 −0.016
(0.270) (0.021) (0.270) (0.021) (0.237) (0.020)
Protestants −0.017 0.001 −0.017 0.001 −0.045 0.004
(0.065) (0.005) (0.065) (0.005) (0.064) (0.006)
Jews −0.386 −0.042 −0.387 −0.040 −0.257 −0.030
(0.183)** (0.013)*** (0.183)** (0.012)*** (0.181) (0.011)***
Latitude 0.137 0.022 0.053 0.021
(0.163) (0.013)* (0.181) (0.014)
Longitude −0.031 0.008 0.030 0.013






Doctors per capita 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 34.548 3.946 34.531 3.949 42.528 3.820 43.327 0.493 27.307 1.363
(4.471)*** (0.020)*** (4.472)*** (0.020)*** (0.995)*** (0.107)*** (16.280)*** (1.399) (13.320)** (1.039)
R2 0.43 0.58 0.43 0.58 0.43 0.58 0.44 0.58 0.47 0.65
N 2,064 2,064 2,064 2,064 2,063 2,063 2,060 2,060 1,780 1,780
Note: The table reports correlations between the historical share ofmeshchane and democratic competitiveness (ENC and IDC) in the 1996 presidential elections. The unit of observation is rayon.
Individual columns correspond to regressions with different dependent variables and with different sets of controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for oblast fixed
effects. Regressions estimated usingOLS. TheOster delta for regressions in the first two columns is equal to 0.85 and 2.025, respectively (thus, it exceeds the threshold set byOster for ENCand is
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0.631.Anincrease in themeshchane shareof10percentage
points produces, dependingon specification, an increase in
the press freedom index of 1 standard deviation. Overall,
the results reaffirm our interpretation of baseline findings
as evidence of political competitiveness rather than
regional electorates’ specific political preferences.
Testing Mechanisms: Education
Having demonstrated the importance of themeshchane
legacy for democratic competitiveness, we now test our
first hypothesized transmission mechanism, education
(H2). Specifically, we ascertain whether meshchane
covary with Imperial education proxies and whether
historical education is in turn a predictor of contem-
porary education levels. To explain human capital
persistence, we also deploy Soviet-period statistics cap-
turing regional occupational and educational structure
and test whether it covaries with meshchane.
Meshchane and Persistence in Education
Our key outcome variable here is university attain-
ment, a plausible proxy of human capital considering
that the USSR boasted virtually universal literacy
by the 1950s. Despite impressive strides in educational
development, university degrees remained out of reach
to most citizens. In 1979, only 5.55% of Soviet popula-
tion aged 10 and older had a complete or incomplete
university education.4 Although it expanded consider-
ably in post-communist Russia, among those 15 and
older only 16.2% and 23.4%, in 2002 and 2010, respect-
ively, obtained a university education.5 Our measure of
university attainment is rayon citizens with university
degrees per 1,000 people (SA3.12 reports the oblast-
level analysis). Table 3 shows that a 1-percentage-point
increase in the share of meshchane leads to increase in
rayon university degree holders by approximately 0.3
points. The average share of rayon degree holders is
13% (see also SA3.13 and SA3.14).6
Furthermore, meshchane are positively correlated
with historical literacy rates (correlation coefficient of
0.432), the best proxy for Imperial human capital
absent systematic Russia-wide data on schooling and
tertiary education. Literacy, in turn, is positively and
significantly correlated with contemporary university
education (correlation coefficient 0.331) and is itself a
significant predictor of competitiveness (for further
analysis, see SA3.13–SA3.16).
Meshchane and Persistence in Education-Intensive
Employment
Next, we ascertain the links between Imperial human
capital and Imperial and Soviet occupational structure
employing additional author-assembled data. New his-
torical accounts and memoirs are strongly suggestive
of professionalization of meshchane in Tzarist Russia
TABLE 2. Meshchane and Media Independence in 1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Meshchane 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.006
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)**
Oil extraction 0.279 0.372 0.703
(0.217) (0.199)* (0.299)**
Income per capita −1.277 8.987 −53.089
(35.861) (33.193) (52.075)
Urbanization 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.001)**
Share of ethnic Russians 0.002 0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)***
Share of population with university degree 0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
Distance from Moscow −0.003 0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.252 0.049 −0.022 0.011
(0.021)*** (0.043) (0.062) (0.085)
R2 0.26 0.42 0.52 0.43
N 76 76 76 71
Five regions with largest meshchane share excluded Yes
Note: The table reports correlations between the historical share ofmeshchane andmedia freedom index in 1999. The unit of observation is
region. Individual columns correspond to regressions with different sets of controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions
estimated using OLS. The Oster delta for the regression (3) is 0.504 and thus below the threshold. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
4 https://www.sovetika.ru/sssr/nas7907.htm#.
5 https://memo.hse.ru/ind_w10_0_01.
6 The number is smaller than the 16%or 23% reported above due to a
handful of rayony with large populations and sizeable populations of
university degree holders. Furthermore, Moscow and St. Petersburg
are excluded from our sample.

























































































































(HA.II). We therefore test for covariance between
meshchane and “bourgeois” white-collar occupations.
Deploying 1897 census data, we identify the occupa-
tional categories of health care, education, and research
as reasonable proxies of white-collar professions requir-
ing specialized skills beyondbasic literacyandnumeracy.
This is precisely the skills set that theBolsheviks drewon
as they developed essential public services and rapidly
industrialized. We find highly significant correlations
between meshchane and white-collar occupations in
uezd-level employment in 1897. Figure 3 plots the cor-
relation coefficients for various occupations and separ-
ately for the total labor force, male and female.
We now trace correspondence between Imperial
social structure and Soviet skills-intensive occupations,
namely engineering and medicine. Absent rayon-level
education data, we gathered oblast statistics for 1960–
1980 (percentage of employees with university degrees
in regional populations) and for number of university-
educated engineers and doctors in 1960, 1965, and 1970,
the last year for which data are available (thousands of
people). Table 4 shows that both Imperial era literacy
and share ofmeshchane are strong predictors of Soviet-
period high-skilled workforce. A 10-percentage-point
increase in meshchane boosts the regional population
share of educated labor force in 1980 by 1% (the
regional mean is 4.2%). (See also HA Tables 6–7).
Meshchane and Soviet Educational Infrastructure
As noted above, our narrative is sensitive to both
familial channels of human capital transmission and
state policy perpetuating social structure. We there-
fore examine covariance between the “old” bour-
geoisie and location of Soviet-period skills-intensive
infrastructures like higher educational institutions.
Contrary to the USSR-propagated myth about the
de novo origin of Soviet educational achievements,
many of Russia’s top universities had been estab-
lished before the Bolsheviks took power (SA3.17).
TABLE 3. Meshchane and Contemporary Education Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Meshchane 3.063 2.731 2.803 2.354 1.236 2.192 3.391
(0.346)*** (0.381)*** (0.396)*** (0.344)*** (0.301)*** (0.280)*** (0.380)***
Imperial Industrial
employment
0.422 0.408 −0.079 0.036
(0.199)** (0.195)** (0.175) (0.174)
Shares of religious groups in the Imperial period
Old believers −0.056 −0.186 −0.041
(0.183) (0.192) (0.182)
Catholics 3.019 1.753 0.689
(3.671) (2.942) (2.603)
Protestants −0.863 −0.405 −0.134
(1.214) (0.974) (0.882)













Income per capita 0.005
(0.000)***
Constant 129.130 128.115 107.198 63.153 217.882 −32.336 112.874
(15.938)*** (15.926)*** (27.138)*** (23.331)*** (71.615)*** (22.421) (2.207)***
R2 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.63 0.74 0.62 0.08
N 1,630 1,630 1,629 1,629 1,458 1,629 1,630
Oblast fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Note: The table reports correlations between the historical share of meshchane and education levels (number of rayon inhabitants with
university degree per 1,000 people). The unit of observation is rayon. Individual columns correspond to regressions with different sets of
controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions estimated using OLS. The Oster delta for regressions in the column is equal
to 1.11 and thus slightly exceeds the threshold. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

























































































































We also establish covariance between Imperial social
structure and location of specially designated “closed
cities” where leading engineers, scientists, and other
professionals labored in space, weapons production,
and other high-tech industries (SA3.18). Finally, we
link penal labor that the state used to effect rapid
development to Imperial social structure. While the
Gulag notoriously exploited inmates for break-back
manual work, recent evidence points to strategic and
selective exploitation of skilled professionals in sen-
sitive industries within the “archipelago” (Khlevniuk
2015). We demonstrate covariance between these
variables and pre-Revolutionary concentration




Meshchane and Imperial Entrepreneurship
We now test H3 concerning entrepreneurship, our
twin facet of bourgeois legacy, something more
straightforwardly traced to “old” middle-class values
FIGURE 3. Correlation Coefficients between Meshchane Share and Shares of Specific Occupational





































INTELLECTUALS TEACHERS DOCTORS LAWYERS
Total Male Female
Note: “Intellectual” occupations encompass health care, education, and research; doctors—all categories of health care employment,
including nurses.





Number of engineers with
university education
Number of doctors with
university education
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1960 1965 1970 1960 1965 1970
Effect of pre-Revolutionary literacy
Literacy rate 0.055 0.070 0.079 0.090 0.099 0.032 0.042 0.051 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.023)** (0.029)** (0.034)** (0.041)** (0.044)** (0.013)** (0.017)** (0.020)** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Effect of pre-Revolutionary social structure
Meshchane 0.086 0.112 0.127 0.142 0.155 0.045 0.061 0.075 0.010 0.012 0.011
(0.046)* (0.059)* (0.069)* (0.081)* (0.089)* (0.027)* (0.035)* (0.043)* (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
Note: The table summarizes results of two sets of regressions, all controlling for ethnic regions (autonomous republics) and distance from
Moscow. Effects of control variables suppressed. The first set of regressions reports the correlations between Imperial-period literacy rates
and communist-period education levels (shares of employees with university degree) and number of engineers and doctors with university
degrees. The second set of regressions correlates the historical share of meshchane with communist-era characteristics. The unit of
observation is region. Individual columns correspond to regressions with different dependent variables. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressions estimated using OLS. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

























































































































than specialized training. While the Bolsheviks eagerly
promoted mass education, they were keen to obliterate
the vestiges of private enterprise. Entrepreneurship in
our analysis is also conceptually linked to the education
aspect of the legacy, however, in that it helps broaden
employment opportunities beyond public sector jobs.
Generally in present-day autocracies, proprietors of
businesses are reportedly more supportive of democ-
racy than citizens who owe their livelihoods to the state
(Chen 2013). To begin to tease out the meshchane’s
entrepreneurial legacy, we again turn to the 1897 cen-
sus and analyze the covariance between meshchane
and trade, entrepreneurial, and rentier pursuits. We
find strong and significant correlations between these
social-structure and occupational variables. Figure 4
reports the correlations between meshchane and
trade-sector employment, share of rentier receiving
income from capital as their main source of earnings,
and share of employees in small-scale and light indus-
tries. For the trade and rentiermeasures, the correlation
is particularly strong.
Persistence of Legacies through the Soviet Period
Were the meshchane’s entrepreneurial legacies in evi-
dence during the Soviet period? This question is not
entirely fanciful—the 1937 census, the last to employ
Imperial social categories, revealed that many respond-
ents were rentier. There was also a vast black market
in consumer goods (Edele 2011; Osokina 2001). One
systematic proxy for communist entrepreneurship is
the Gorbachev-era cooperative movement initiated in
1988. The “worker cooperatives” were largely indistin-
guishable in ownership structure from classic small
FIGURE 4. Correlation Coefficients between Share ofMeshchane and Share of Specific Occupational



































LIGHT INDUSTRY SMALL INDUSTRY TRADE RENTIER
Total Male Female
TABLE 5. Meshchane and Cooperative Movement in the late 1980s
Dependent variable Number of cooperatives Cooperatives, employment
Meshchane 138.259 4.428
(64.310)** (1.947)**
Per capita income (1990) 6,517.884 249.328
(7,296.161) (250.651)
Urbanization (1990) 45.894 1.790
(21.822)** (0.576)***






Note: The table reports correlations between the historical share of meshchane and number of cooperatives/size of cooperatives-
employed workforce in the late 1980s. The unit of observation is region. Individual columns correspond to regressions with different
dependent variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions estimated using OLS. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

























































































































and medium size enterprises in capitalist countries
(Bim, Jones, and Weisskopf 1993). Table 5 demon-
strates, using oblast-level statistics on cooperatives
and their employees (published by Goskomstat) and
controlling for Soviet developmental indicators, that
meshchane significantly covary with perestroika-era
proto-entrepreneurship. Put simply, if we take two
regions with similar developmental characteristics as
measured by urbanization and wealth, the region with
significantly higher entrepreneurial activity in the late
1980s would also have had a higher population share of
meshchane in 1897. An increase in meshchane share of
1 percentage point produced additional 138 regional
cooperatives, with the average number being 1,840.We
also run specifications controlling for literacy, to ascer-
tain whether the effect is due tomeshchane rather than















Meshchane 1.202 1.266 0.712 0.792 0.500 0.532
(0.219)*** (0.223)*** (0.326)** (0.329)** (0.444) (0.437)
Nobility 0.890 0.968 1.061
(0.224)*** (0.300)*** (0.355)***
Merchants 0.898 0.647 0.622
(0.258)*** (0.360)* (0.424)




Constant −2.003 −2.175 −2.842 −3.093 −3.381 −3.746
(0.080)*** (0.092)*** (0.114)*** (0.133)*** (0.145)*** (0.184)***
N 1,602 1,593 1,602 1,602 1,602 1,602
Note: The table reports the correlations between self-reported Imperial ancestry and occupation of parents in the Soviet period from the
Levada survey. Individual columns correspond to regressions with different dependent variables and sets of explanatory variables.
Regressions estimated using logit. Robust standard errors in parentheses. “Foreigners” dropped in one of the regressions due to perfect
prediction. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
TABLE 6. Meshchane and Entrepreneurship
Dependent variable








Meshchane 0.256 2.761 11.576 36.208 0.244
(0.098)** (1.131)** (4.615)** (15.199)** (0.135)*
Income per capita 0.000 0.003 0.018 0.064 −0.000
(0.000) (0.001)** (0.008)** (0.029)** (0.000)
Resource extraction
share
−0.040 −0.568 −3.661 −12.347 0.046
(0.030) (0.284)** (1.702)** (5.857)** (0.066)
Share of ethnic
Russians
−0.069 −0.256 −0.846 −2.870 0.046
(0.031)** (0.183) (0.712) (2.006) (0.042)
Urbanization 0.006 0.822 2.390 3.878 0.078
(0.056) (0.510) (2.016) (6.017) (0.087)
Distance from
Moscow
0.349 −3.252 −21.317 −62.326 −0.965
(0.233) (1.140)*** (6.792)*** (23.582)** (0.301)***
Constant 10.986 −78.228 −337.019 −1,071.654 59.934
(2.752)*** (26.056)*** (113.431)*** (395.576)*** (4.566)***
R2 0.24 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.37
N 75 77 77 77 77
Note: The table reports the correlations between the historical share ofmeshchane and characteristics of the small-to-medium-enterprise
(SME) sector in 2012 per share of respondents in a region claiming to be willing to run their own business in the ARENA survey (https://
sreda.org/arena). The unit of observation is region. Individual columns correspond to regressions with different dependent variables.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions estimated using OLS. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

























































































































an artifact of other estates with relatively high educa-
tion levels (SA3.20).
Meshchane and Contemporary Entrepreneurship
Next, we employ available regional data on post-
communist entrepreneurship as well as survey data on
individuals’ willingness to start their own businesses
(see SA3.20). We find significant covariance between
the “old” bourgeoisie and present-day entrepreneur-
ship, willingness to become entrepreneurs, and private-
sector employment (from the representative public
opinion survey). Thus, the share of those willing to
start a business in a region rises by 2.5%, with a 10%
point rise in meshchane share; the proportion of those
interested in establishing their own businesses varies
between 3% and 22%. SA3.20 reports the results of
regressions of entrepreneurship variables on literacy in
1897. Because literacy has no significant effect on self-
reported willingness to start a business, entrepreneurial
legacies are in our analysis appropriately distinguished
from those of human capital, though both, we argue,
engender greater citizen autonomy in an autocracy.
Controlling for literacy, the meshchane effect remains
robust, except for private-sector employment.
Legacies of Social Structure and Soviet
Occupational Patterns: Survey Evidence
Up to now we explored the legacies of spatial variation
in the distribution of estates. Because we are keen to
address potential concerns of ecological inference,
we commissioned a micro-level survey from Levada,
Russia’s reputable polling agency.7 In the first survey of
this kind probing links between estate ancestry and
occupational pathways, respondents were asked about
the estate of their (great)-grandparents before the
Revolution and their family’s Soviet-period social pos-
ition. Details of the survey methodology are presented
in SA4.
We begin by examining the self-reported Soviet-
period social status of those claiming meshchane and
other “educated” estates ancestry. This helps further
probe whethermeshchane’s descendants were likely to
opt for skilled occupations (an alternative test of H2).
Table 7 reports the covariance between self-reported
Imperial origins and Soviet social status. We regress
the estate data on human-capital-intensive Soviet
occupations of parents encompassing civil servants
(bureaucracy), intellectual occupations (teachers, doc-
tors, engineers), and high-level state officials. We run
two regressions in each case: one employing a dummy
for those withmeshchane origin and one with dummies
for the other “educated” estates. The residual cat-
egory is peasants, Cossacks, and smaller estates. We
find that self-reported meshchane descendants are
significantly more likely to report civil servant or
intellectual occupations during the communist period.
There is, however, no link between meshchane—and
merchant—origin and high-level state positions. The
result is consistent with our conjecture that the bour-
geois estates became the backbone of professional
middle class—a status distinct from position in the
highest ranks of the state and party apparatus. And
it suggests that the old bourgeoisie tended to opt for
the least ideologically tarnished employment—the
skilled professional, not party-managerial, routes to
social mobility.8
Our micro-level data is an asset for our analysis also
because it helps corroborate continuities in social struc-
ture in space. We merge our spatial and survey data to
explore whether self-reported meshchane ancestry is
correlated with historical share of meshchane in the
respondent’s region. We find strong evidence that
residents of regions with higher meshchane share in
the past are also more likely to report meshchane
ancestry. This finding is notable given the known com-
positional shifts in the population due to Soviet migra-
tion, repressions, and other dislocations (SA4.6). The
developmental projects of the totalizing communist
state may have profoundly affected Russian society,
but they failed to completely obliterate the old regime’s
social fabric. SA4.4 and SA4.5 show that self-reported
ancestry has a strong and consistent with our theory
effect on political outcomes, further supporting our
argument.
DISCUSSION
We assembled original data and analyzed the implica-
tions of reproduction of the “old”middle class emerging
within an “organic” context of capitalist development
for democratic processes in a polity subjected to state-
ledmodernization.Highly disaggregatedpre-communist
census data allow us to single outmeshchane—a vestige
of the estates-based feudal social order—as a proto-
bourgeoisie. In late Imperial Russia, this group
colonized the professions; engaged in trading, family
enterprise, and rentier pursuits; and enjoyed legally
enshrined self-governance earlier and greater in scope
than the peasant subject populations. In what is an
important finding for theories of the political role of
themiddle class in autocracies, we find strong covariance
between the population share of these upwardly mobile
groups and regional democratic competitiveness and
media freedom, our proxies of democratic variations,
over and above the effects of communist state-driven
modernization.
Two hypothesized causal channels linking mesh-
chane to regional democratic outcomes were proposed:
(a) human capital stocks engendering a preference
for higher education and prestigious professions and7 We jointly commissioned and designed the survey with Katerina
Tertytchnaya in 2019. Results of the survey are summarized in
“Social Structure and Attitudes towards Protest: Survey Evidence
from Russia.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2020.
8 We also estimate a modification of these regressions, adding a
dummy for those claiming peasant descent, but it is insignificant.

























































































































(b) intergenerational entrepreneurial value transmis-
sion. We acknowledge the parallel channel of the cre-
ation of educated strata from amongst hitherto
underprivileged worker and peasant groups—the
“new” middle class. But our statistical tests establish
that the bourgeoisie nurtured within the more autono-
mous context of Imperial capitalist development is
associated with significantly higher subnational demo-
cratic competitiveness and media freedom. To account
for the apparent patterns of the reproduction of bour-
geois values under communism, we consider policies
intrinsic to the Soviet state’s developmental agenda,
which built on pre-Revolutionary bourgeoisie’s human
capital. We also explore the transmission of values
related to both education and the market operating
outside of Soviet policy.
We find strong and robust covariance between
“bourgeois” legacies and regional distribution of pro-
fessions like doctor and engineer, location of
expertise-intensive “secret cities” furthering Soviet
cutting-edge industrial programs, and even the spatial
location of Gulag camps that likewise serviced the
USSR’s developmental effort. There is also strong
evidence of transmission of market-supporting values,
which, unlike human capital, are more straightfor-
wardly conceptualized as exogenous to Soviet pol-
icies. We find that meshchane are associated with
not only perestroika-era proto-entrepreneurship but
also with private business occupational choices out-
side of public-sector employment in present-day
Russia. The analysis of author-commissioned survey
data likewise reveals estate legacies consistent with
the hypothesized mechanisms. These findings are
confirmed in a battery of additional statistical tests
and corroborated in author-assembled archival and
memoir materials.
Our findings have significant implications for
debates on the role of the educated middle classes
in eroding, or, alternatively, augmenting authoritar-
ianism. One promising strand of theorizing has high-
lighted that not all “educated” “white-collar” strata
are made of the same cloth when it comes to orien-
tations toward the political system (Chen 2013;
Rosenfeld 2017). Being “middle class” does not mean
citizens would fail to cast a vote for autocracy. Far
from it. Unfortunately, conventional survey and other
data instruments force the scholar to work with gen-
eric categories of class, income, and occupation. These
are insensitive to the fine historically conditioned and
reproduced tapestries of variations among groups
bracketed together. As our analysis demonstrates,
these legacies may shape not only wider orientations
toward the political sphere but also occupational
choices that help sustain a modicum of independence
from state pressures.
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